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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action involves a written lease agreement covering
real property wherein plaintiffs sued defendants-for breach of the
terms thereof, i.e. non-payment.

Defendants denied breach thereof

and affirmatively alleged multiple defenses and asserted a
counterclaim against plaintiffs for damages result-rug from
plaintiff's breach of the Lease Agreement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court disposed of the action by granting
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, Dased upon Rule 2.8(e)(f)
Rules of Practice, Dist. and Circ. Ct., which relate' to summary
judgment, for the reason that defendants failed ttr object as
provided by Rule 2.8.

Defendants objected to t-he* -^in'dings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree submitted oy- Plaintiffs
thereafter and moved that the summary judgment be reversed and/or
set aside based upon Rules 52, 56, 59, 60 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the lower court denied allKof defendants1
motions.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the Summary Judgment- entered by
the District Court and to have the case remanded'for a trial on
the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs in this case moved the court foi summary

judgment on their Complaint and defendants Answer & Counterclaim
on or about the 11th day of January, 1988-

On February 8th the

Court granted plaintiffs1 motion pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the
Rules of Practice of the Fourth Judicial District Court for the
reason that the defendants had made no written response to
plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment at that time.

On the

24th day of February, pursuant to said Order of the Court
plaintiffs served upon defendants proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment.

On the 28th day of

February, defendants objected to said Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Summary Judgment, and on the 21st day of
March the Court overruled defendants' objection and ordered the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Summary Judgment signed
on March 16, 1988, to be entered by the clerk and on March 22,
1988, the same was entered

Thereafter, on the March 31, 1988,

defendants moved the District Court to reverse and set aside the
summary judgment entered and on the 30th day of June, 1988, said
court denied defendants1 motion and defendants appealed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT HAD UNTIL FEBRUARY 19, 1988 TO RESPOND TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT
PREMATURELY GRANTED PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS ON FEBRUARY 8, 1988
Rule 2.8(g), Rules of Practice, Dist. & Cir. Ct., states
that:
(2)

In all-cases where the granting of a motion would dispose
of the action or any issues thereof on the merits with
prejudice, the party resisting the motion may request a
hearing and such request shall be granted unless the
motion is summarily denied. If no such request is made
within ten (10) days of notice to submit for decision, a
hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived.
Rule 6, U.R.C.P., provides as follows:
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local rules of
any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable
statute, the date of the act, event, or default from which
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be
included. The last day of the period so computed shall be
included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of
the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is
less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and
legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a
party has the right or is required to do some act or take
some proceedings within a prescribed period after the
service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice
or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added
to the prescribed period.
Plaintiff's request for ruling was mailed to defendants on
the 3rd day of February, 1988, which was a Wednesday (Record, p.
239).

Pursuant to Rule 6(a)(e) and Rule 2.8(g), supra, the first

date that the court could have ruled would have been Tuesday,
February 9, 1988, provided the ruling was not dispositive of the
action.

The court ruled on February 8th, 1988 (Record, p. 241).

Rule 2.8, however, gives defendants an additional ten (10) days to
request a hearing in the event that the granting of plaintiffs1
motion would dispose of the action.

(3)

Said Rule further provides

that the court shall grant such a request unless it summarily
denies the dispositive motion.

It is obvious in this case, even

ignoring the extension of time for mailing and weekends, provided
by Rule 6, that Rule 2.8 would have prohibited the court from
entering the judgment prior to February 15, 1988.
POINT II.
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WERE BEFORE THE COURT AT THE TIME IT
GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In order for the District Court to grant the relief it did
in this particular case it would have had to strike defendants'
Answer and Counterclaim, as well as the sworn testimony in the
depositions of Frank K. Stuart and Carlene Stuart.
foregoing pleadings

The

were before the court at the time it granted

summary judgment, and said depositions created issues which could
not be resolved without a trial on the merits. (See Record,
p.161; plaintiffs' motion to publish the depositions of Frank and
Carlene Stuart dated 12/15/870.

See also Record, p.126, lines

17,22, and p.127, line 1, and p.132, line 8, wherein plaintiffs
refer to the depositions of Frank K. and Carlene Stuart in its
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on
Defendants' Counterclaim.)

Defendants Answers to Plaintiffs'

Interrogatories and their Reply to Request for Admissions were
filed on February 26, 1988, simultaneously with defendants'
objections to plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact and

(4)

conclusions of law, which, even though filed after the court's
original order of February 8, 1988, were filed with the court at
the time it denied defendants' initial objection and subsequent
motions. (Record, p.312,254,287.)

It is obvious that after

examining all of the foregoing items, which were before the
court, that said court ignored them all.

It is further obvious

from the extensive Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered by the Court that issues were raised by the material
before court at the time the initial order of February 8, 1988
was made.

(Record, pp.322-333, entitled Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law; and Record, pp.333-335, entitled Ruling; and
Record, pp.336-338, entitled Order and Judgment), it is also
obvious that the District Court ignored all of the pleadings in
granting the relief that it did.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure entitled
"Summary Judgment" provides, among other things, the following:
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim or crossclaim . . . . may move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor upon all or any part thereof. (Emp Added)
56(c) of said Rules, entitled "Motion and Proceedings Thereon"
provides, among other things, as follows:
The motion shall be served at least ten days before the
time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to
the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, deposi tions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, Lf any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
(5)

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
(Emp* added)
The inquiry upon review of a summary judgment which should
be conducted by the trial court is as follows:

Are there material

issues of fact to be litigated; if there are then summary judgment
is not applicable and the moving party is not entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.

Summary judgment is a preemptory

remedy and the trial court in determining whether a material
issue of facts exist for the purpose of applying Rule 56r to-wit:
summary judgment, must view the facts and their inferences in the
light most favorable to the party moved against.

See Sport v.

Crested Butte Silver Mining, 740 P2d 1304.
In Olwell v. Clark, 658 P2d 585, the Court in substance
said that it is not always required that a party proffer
affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary judgment in
order to avoid judgment against him.

The Rule states

specifically that a response in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment must be supported by affidavits or other
documents only to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of
fact for trial.
Rule 56(e), which relates to affidavits, is not mandatory
and

does not require the opposing party to submit opposing

affidavits when the same are not necessary.

What it requires,

among other things, is that the court may permit affidavits to be

(6)

supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.
In Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P2d 387, the
court in discussing the particular point in question relating to
56(c) et seq. , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stated:
It [summary judgment] should be granted only when it
clearly appears that there is no reasonable probabilitity
that a party moved against could prevail. As this court
explained the standard:
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. If there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, the doubt sh_quld be
resolved in favor of the opposing party. Thusy the
court must evaluate all the evidence and aJJL
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence
in a light most favorable to the party opposing
summary.
(Emp added)
The Court in Frisbee goes on to quote the standard taken
from Olwell v. Clark, supra, wherein the following was stated:
Rule 56(e) specifically states that a response in
opposition to a motion must be supported by affidavits or
other documents only in order to demonstrate that there
is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Where the party
opposed to the motion submits no documents in opposition,
the moving party may be granted summary judgment only "if
appropriate", that is if he is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
(Emp. added)
In this case the plaintiffs own affidavit in support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment in and of itself raises issues to be
tried by this court.

Said affidavit of plaintiffs is contrary to

(7)

most of the pleadings and sworn testimony offered by the
defendants in this case prior to plaintiffs submitting any
affidavit.

Defendantsf, and other independent witnesses1, answers

given in depositions taken by plaintiffs are contrary to the
affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs in support of plaintiffs1
Motion for Summary Judgment and, as previously indicated, were
before the Court and used by plaintiffs to support their Motion
for Summary Judgment when the court granted summary relief,
summary review

A

of all of the aforesaid pleadings,

interrogatories, reply to request for admissions, and depositions,
which is required by Rule 56, supra, wouJd have indicated that
there are substantial material issues that should be tried by the
lower court.
The Court, in Webster v. Sill, 675 P2d 1170, Utah (1983),
stated at page 1172s
As a matter of general evidence law, a deposition is
generally a more reliable means of ascertaining the truth
than an affidavit, since a deponent is subject to
cross-examination and an affiant is not. See also 6 J.
Moore, W. Taggart and J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice
§56,11(4) at 56-277 (1983). (Emp. added)
In Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, Utah (1984) the Court
stated as follows:
A motion for summary judgment can only be granted when
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and
"even assuming the facts as asseted by the party moved
against to be true, could not prevail". This Court has
also stated:
Since the party moved against is denied the
(8)

opportunity of presenting his evidence and his
contentions, it is and should be the policy of the
courts to act on such motions with great caution, to
assure that a party whose cause might have merit is
not deprived of the right to access to the courts for
the enforcement of rights or the redress of wrongs.
(Emp. added)
In Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co., 745 P2d 838
(Utah App. 1987) the court stated at page 840 that:
We review the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the . . ., the parties to whom the judgment
was granted. . . Summary judgment should be granted only
when it is clear from the undisputed facts that the
opposing party cannot prevail. . . Generally, summary
judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete
since information sought in discovery may create genuine
issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion.
(Emp. added)
In this particular case there has been substantial
discovery completed as indicated heretofore herein, but defendants
have not as yet deposed the plaintiffs and had advised counsel
for plaintiffs that they intended to do so prior to the filing of
this summary judgment.

Thus, unless plaintiffs herein have filed

their Notice of Readiness for Trial and certified to the court
that all discovery is complete the defendants may still proceed
with discovery and intend to do so.
In Rich v. McGovern, 551 P2d 1266 (1976), the Supreme Court
summarized the duties of the court with regard to a motion for
summary judgment.

At page 1267 sajd court stated:

The purpose of the motion for summary judgment is to
provide a means for searching out the undisputed facts as
shown by the "submissionsM to the court, i.e., the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and answers to
(9)

interrogatories and documents; and if on that basis the
controversy can be settled as a matter of ibavr,—fefrat willsave the time, trouble and expense of a triaL. However
inasmuch as the party moved against is being defeated
without the privilege of a trial, the court should
carefully scrutinize the "submissions" and contentions he
makes thereon to see if his contentions and proposals as
to proof of material facis, if resolved in his favoru
would entitle him to prevail; and if it so appears, the
motion for summary judgment should be denied and a trial
should be had for the purpose of resolving the disputed
issues of fact and determining the rights of the parties.
(Emp. added)
It appears from the court's memorandum decision (Record,
p.336, 400, 407) that unless an objection is made or a
counter-affidavit is submitted in opposition to plaintiffs1
motion for summary judgment that the court's duty is to
automatically grant summary judgment pursuant to Ruie 2.8.
respectfully submitted that this is not the law.

It is

Defendants

believe that the law places more responsibility on the court.

It

is defendants' position that the court, when disposing of an
action by summary judgment, should consider all of the material
before it prior to ruling.

Defendants, prior to plaintiffs

filing its Affidavit in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment responded under oath to plaintiffs' questions in two
depositions, a set of interrogatories and request for admissions.
Reference is made to paragraph 9 of the affidavit of John
R. Thackeray filed in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment which states as follows:
That as a rental payment for said property the defendants
agreed to pay the s um of $1,500.00 per month, plus
(10)

percentage rent, consumer price adjustments, common area
expenses, late charges, taxes, insurance and sign maintenance
expenses." (Record, p.163)
Paragraph 4 of defendants1 Reply to Request for
Admissions, against given prior to plaintiffs1 affidavit being
filed, emphatically denys the above quoted portion of plaintiffs1
affidavit. (Record, p.288).

Paragraph 5 of said Reply to Request

for Admissions also specifically controverts plaintiffs'
statement in his affidavit. (Record, p.288-289).
The Court's attention is further directed to the balance of
the replies given by defendants to plaintiff's Request for
Admissions, specifically paragraphs 6-34, all of which relate to
rent payments referred to in plaintiffs' affidavit and all of
which are emphatically denied by defendant.

(Record, p.289-294).

Obviously, plaintiffs knew when they filed the motion for
summary judgment that there were issues raised by plaintiffs' own
affidavit.

It is to be noted that the courts have stated the

summary judgment is to shorten and cut down costs and expense, but
it only works when the rules are properly applied by those in the
practice, and if not properly applied then the process is merely
protracted and made more expensive as in this case.
Further issues are raised in plaintiffs' affidavit by
defendants Answers to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories, said answers
also having been given prior to plaintiffs' affidavit.

The courts

attention is directed to paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19

(11)

of said affidavit (Record, p.164-168).

Defendant, in answering

said interrogatories in June, 1987, stated, under oath, facts
controverting all claims made in plaintiffs' affidavit.

(Record,

p.254-286).
The court's attention is further directed to defendants
supplemental answers to plaintiffs' interrogatories, which answers
were again made prior to the time plaintiffs filed their affidavit
in support of its motion for summary judgment which, again,
controvert plaintiffs' affidavit and thereby raises issues to be
determined by the court.

(Record, p.243-253).

The plaintiffs specifically relied upon the deposition of
Frank K. Stuart and Carlene Stuart in its memorandum in support
of its motion for summary judgment (Record, p.125-135), and had
said depositions published on or about December 15, 1987
(Record, p.161, Motion to Publish Depositions).

Said depositions

were obviously published by plaintiffs and the above-entitled
court prior to the time that plaintiffs' affidavit in support of
his motion for summary judgment was filed, and both of said
depositions controvert the facts stated in plaintiffs' affidavit,
and the court should have had access to both depositions at the
time it ruled on plaintiffs' motion inasmuch as plaintiffs had
previously published the same.

The deposition of Carlene Stuart

in summary states that there was conversation at some time at or
about the time the lease was signed that there would not be

(12)

another tanning salon within the leased complex.

See Carlene

Stuart's deposition, p.26, lines 10-25, and p.27-29, p. 30, lines
12-35, p.31, p.32, lines 9-25, p.33, lines 1-25, p.34, lines 1-6,
all of which relate to breach of and interference with
contractual rights of the parties when defendants were in
possession, as does p.40, lines 5-25, and p.41, which relates to
the reduction of the rent, p.42, lines 1-6, which controverts the
affidavit as to the date the property was vacated, p.43, lines
1-9 again relating to the reduction of the rent, p.45, lines
19-25, and p.46-48, which relate to the allegations made in the
counterclaim relating to fraudulent inducements made by
plaintiffs to defendant Frank K. Stuart to induce him to sign the
lease.

Said inducements being that there would be no other

tanning salon in the complex in question.

P.56, lines 1-5, the

witness talks about reduction of the lease as she does on p.57,
lines 8-25, wherein she indicates that the rent reduction is to
continue through the end of the lease.

P.59, lines 7-25,

indicate that there may have been one or two payments due and
owing, if any, at the time the property was vacated, and at the
time the property was vacated plaintiffs released defendants from
any other obligation on the lease.

P.79, talks about reduction

of the lease payments again as well as said reduction being
retroactive and continuing to the end of the lease, as does p.80.
Page 82, lines 8-25, reference is again made to the reduction in

(13)

rent and the release from said lease, and the offer to re-lease
the same premises on a month-to-month basis after vacating the
same.

Reference is also made to defendants Answer to Plaintiffs

Interrogatories regarding the same and is continued on p.83 of
said deposition, and at p.85, lines 1-20 of said deposition,
wherein the witness again reiterates her position with regard tc
the interference with the lease/contract in question.

At p.86,

lines 14-25, the witness talks about her understanding with
regard to Jean's Nails tanning beds, to-wit:

there were to be

used for nails customers only and not for any other purpose.
That understanding was gained at or prior to the time the lease
signed, and said depositon through p.87-92 explains that the
understanding with regards to Jean's Nails was obtained at or
prior to the time said lease was signed, but said witness
indicated that she did not know when said lease was signed so she
could not really testify to the same.
In summary, the witness Carlene Stuart in her deposition
denys the amount due, talks about interference with contract,
fraud and all of the allegations set forth in defendants1 Answer
and Counterclaim, all of which controverts under oath plaintiffs
affidavit in support of summary judgment, and plaintiff Thackeray
knew, or should have known, at the time he filed his affidavit
that the statements made therein would raise numerous issues in
this case because plaintiffs1 counsel took the depositions.

(14)
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'

o t I le above

At p.20, lines 8-25, and p.21-24, p.25, lines 1-5, said
deposition relates to problems encountered with the competing
tanning salon after the contract was signed, and efforts to
rectify the problems.

This portion of the deposition is part of

the basis for interference with contract and fraud.

Also, said

pages refer to conversations regarding the reduction of the rent
and agreement to reduce the same by 25% as indicated by Carlene
Stuart's deposition.

Frank K. Stuart and Carlene Stuart's

depositions, published prior to the filing of plaintiffs'
affidavit, and relied upon by both plaintiffs and the court in
granting plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment created issues
which should have been obvious to the court and plaintiffs.
P.33, lines 7-25 of Frank K. Stuart's deposition relates
to the fraud perpetuated by plaintiffs upon defendants prior to
the execution of the lease.

P.34, lines 15-25, and all of

p.35-38, p.39, lines 1-5, relate to the losses sustained by
reason of the interference with the contract during the operation
of the business and fraud perpetuated on defendants by
plaintiffs.

P.41, lines 16-25, the witness indicates that

plaintiffs disagree with the amount claimed in the complaint,
which may or may not be the same as the amounts claimed in
plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
P.42, lines 7-11 specifically, defendant states that "it
was my understanding that the rent was to terminate when we moved
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than ten days after entry of the judgment.

In the case of Hume v

Small Claims Court of Murray City, 590 P2d 309 (Utah 1979), the
court covered the issue as to whether or not the Motion to Alter
or Amend a Judgment could properly be used for the purpose of
setting aside or reversing a judgment.

The Court stated at page

310 as follows:
[1] The first issue presented is whether petitioner's
motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) was
properly taken.
Rule 59(e) provides:
A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be
served not later than ten days after the entry of the
judgment.
Defendant argues that this rule cannot be used for the
purpose of reversing a judgment or rehearing the
arguments. Defendants' argument is without merit. Under
Rule 59 a party may move for a new trial upon any of the
grounds stated therein.
Subdivision (e) of Rule 59 provides a time limitation for
this type of motion, which is directed to the Court for
rehearing of its own judgment. Such motions must be based
on one or more of the grounds set forth in subdivision
(a).
(Emp. added)
Rule 59(a)(1),(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
provide as follows:
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, . .
.or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(a)(7) Error in law.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on their face
clearly show evidence that material issues of fact were raised
(18)
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ana

In Mountain States, Etc. v Atkin, Wright & Miles, supra,
the court stated that:
Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the
court before judgment can be rendered against them unless
it is obvious from the evidence before the court that the
party opposing judgment can establish no right to
recovery.
It appears that the lower court in order to reach the
conclusion it did, decided that Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice
of the District Court superseded and abrogated case law holdings
under Rule 56 U.R.C.P., as well as the case law itself.

In any

event, this seems to be the result reached by said Court.

(See

Rulings, Record, pp.241, 333, 400).
Rule 2*1 of the Rules of Practice of the District Court
provides that:
These rules shall govern the practice and procedure in the
district courts and circuit courts of the state of ntah in
all matters not specifically covered by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(Emp. added)
The Court in construing Rule 2.8, as it did in this matter,
appears to have created something more similar to a default
judgment rather

than a summary judgment, and in order to enter

such a default pursuant to Rule 2.8 the Court would have had to
give superior credence to Rule 2.8 over Rule 56, which would be
contrary to Rule 2.1 of Rules of Practice, District Court.

(20)

POINT IV.
THE FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE REQUIRE THAT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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RULE60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OFCIVIL PROCEDURE
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The motions and counter-motions in this matter took place
at a time that each district court within the state could pick and
choose from the Rules of Practice, Dist. and Circ. Ct.

At that

time the Salt Lake District chose not to apply Rule 2.8, but Utah
County area did.

Other districts from time to time accepted or

rejected the Rule and confusion among the districts existed.
Counsel for defendants practices primarily in Salt Lake County
where is the Rule was not applied, thus because of inadvertance,
as well as other reasons set forth in defendants1 counsel's
affidavit, Rule 2.8 overlooked.

Obviously, counsel for defendants

was not the only practitioner somewhat bewildered by the lack of
uniformity in the application of the rules in question throughout
the districts.

It is respectfully submitted that a substantial

number of lawyers were also caught in the same situation as
indicated by a number of recent articles in the Utah Law Journals
relating to the same, and the final decision to make said rules
uniform throughout the district as of October 30, 1988.

It is

unfortunate, in the opinion of defendants' counsel, that said Rule
2.8 was adopted as it is written.

It is diametrically opposed to

the intent and writing of Rule 56, U.R.C.P, supra, as well as the
case law relating thereto, and if not applied judiciously by the
varies judges of the district and circuit courts, Rule 2.8 totally
ignores substance in favor of procedure.
The Honorable Scott DanieLs, Presiding Judge, Salt Lake

(22)
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proceeding for the following reasons

"

(emp added).

See also Sperry v. Smith, 694 P2d 581 (Utah 1984), where
the Court set aside a summary judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b).
In the Katz case, supra, the court further stated that when
deciding whether a default judgment should be set aside, the court
should balance the equities on a case by case basis, including
such considerations as preference to allow presentation of all
claims and defenses, any delay or unfairness in the parties
conduct, the need for finality of judgments, and the respective
hardships in denying or granting such relief.

The court further

stated at page 93 of Katz v. Prince, supra:
That where there is doubt about whether a default should
be set aside, that doubt should be resolved in favor of
doing so.
It appears from the Rules and Cases that Rule 60(b)
U.R.C.P. applies only after a judgment has been entered and thus
cannot be used until such time.

If Rule 60(b) could have been

used, as indicated in the Court's Memorandum Decision denying
Defendants1 Objection to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment (Record, p.333-335), and in the formal order of the
court denying same (Record, p.386-389), prior to the date that the
judgment was signed and entered, defendant would have proceeded
accordingly, but until a judgment is signed and entered Rule 60(b)
does not have meaning, otherwise defendants would have used it
initially as suggested.
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